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With the company registered to ISO9001:2008, EU CE certification and Russian GOST certification, FTM follows the requirements and specifications set forth all the time to ensure that we are consistently producing the products, and services that meet standards.

Henan Fote Heavy Mining Machinery Co., Ltd. is founded in 1982. Fote is a high-tech industry with a strong commitment to enhancing your productivity, helping reduce environmental impact. From making the optimal solution based on your requirements to providing one-on-one consultation, and providing process-engineered solutions, Fote provides 24 / 7 service, you will get the quickest response to any inquiry.

Fote serves many industries, including construction crushing: jaw crusher, sand making machine; Industrial milling: ultrafine grinding mill, Raymond mill; Ore beneficiation: ball mill, magnetic separator; Green building materials: rotary dryer, dust collector; Tails treatment: briquette machine. Backed by years of process experience and knowledge, Fote provides service and support for the life of each machine.

Mining companies today are faced with declining ore grades, mining is a big business opportunity. Fote provides various types of ore beneficiation equipment to help you achieve high returns.To accommodate the growing population, more houses, roads are needed. Natural sand is being depleted, the demand for artificial sand increases, rich types of Fote sand making equipment can tailor solutions to meet your needs.

Our vision is to meet customer needs and create the greatest economic value for customers through continuous R&D and production of high-quality mining machines, thereby becoming the world's most trusted and valuable manufacturer of crushing, grinding, ore dressing and building material equipment.

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Panchal, the inventor of the Agglomerator/Densifier machine offer a vast array of plastic films, Sheet, Tape, Fibre, Yarn and other plastic waste. we also offer slow speed single-shaft shredder, offers a vast array of grinder/granulators. Our plastic shredding and recycling equipment is designed to handle your bulk material needs with high efficiency. In addition to our mobile and plant based document destruction solutions, and waste recycling systems, we offer full turn-key system design and installation.

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minerals | free full-text | recovery of some critical raw materials from processing waste of feldspar ore related to hydrothermally altered granite: laboratory-scale beneficiation

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Vrbick, T.; Pikryl, R. Recovery of Some Critical Raw Materials from Processing Waste of Feldspar Ore Related to Hydrothermally Altered Granite: Laboratory-Scale Beneficiation. Minerals 2021, 11, 455. https://doi.org/10.3390/min11050455

Vrbick T, Pikryl R. Recovery of Some Critical Raw Materials from Processing Waste of Feldspar Ore Related to Hydrothermally Altered Granite: Laboratory-Scale Beneficiation. Minerals. 2021; 11(5):455. https://doi.org/10.3390/min11050455

Vrbick, Tom, and Richard Pikryl. 2021. "Recovery of Some Critical Raw Materials from Processing Waste of Feldspar Ore Related to Hydrothermally Altered Granite: Laboratory-Scale Beneficiation" Minerals 11, no. 5: 455. https://doi.org/10.3390/min11050455

environmental economics - an overview | sciencedirect topics

Environmental economics has carved out a niche within economics by pushing at the boundaries of anthropocentric economic utilitarianism, for example, by incorporating environmental values into the benefit cost accounts, and by extending market logic and market institutions as deeply as possible into the environmental domain.

Environmental economics is a kind of practical economics its practitioners are trying mostly, I think, to do good in the world or at least that part of the world they can hope to influence. They do not always agree on what might constitute good for more than 40 years, I have listened closely when my fellow environmental economists talk shop casually among themselves, and I have heard claims that our role is to ensure that environmental concerns are fully considered in the arguments and calculations that economists produce, and that it is to knock some economic commonsense into those greenies and any public agencies that might be influenced by them, with roughly equal frequency. Nor do environmental economists agree at a level of principle the century-old debates between those who think government can and should do more to address the issues that do not get much attention in unfettered markets, and those who are quite sure that markets are the best institutions conceivable for getting things right in an imperfect world, are played out yet again in everyday discourse among the environmental economists. Nevertheless, there is a body of beliefs and assumptions that commands majority allegiance among environmental economists, if by no means unanimous assent. For example, most of those who would prefer a more activist role for government in environmental regulation and most of those who would prefer a more hands-off stance agree in considerable detail about what is meant by benefits and costs, and many of them would offer similar reasons as to why policy should be attentive to benefits and costs.

While explicitly acknowledging the intellectual diversity among us, when I characterize the beliefs and assumptions of environmental economists in what follows, for example, to contrast them with those of environmental ethicists, I am referring, unless otherwise indicated, to this body of mainstream beliefs and assumptions.

Environmental, economic and social aspects of the sustainable development can be improved by recycling, depending upon the local circumstances. However, there are several technical aspects, which influence the extent to which the desirable practice of recycling water from plant practices is possible,. As the chemistry of the system is altered, it could affect the process efficiency. This applies specially to flotation, which (as explained in Chapter 3), is principally governed by the chemistry of the ore pulp.

The quality of the external water can range from very high quality, soft water derived from melting snow, or poor quality, hard water (with high levels of dissolved calcium and magnesium) from underground aquifers, and to even lower quality sea water (with very high concentrations of dissolved salts). Some underground water may be more saline than the ocean water. Occasionally, a different source of water is used in the wet and dry seasons. Sewage water from cities is becoming a potential external source with sustainability implications. If the initial quality of the external water is high, the scope for recycling of water from all the products is maximized. Such reuse of recycle water from the products allows chemical species from the oxidation of the ore and from other inputs to the process such as reagents to increase in concentration in the water returned to the plant Such accumulation of species often has negative effect on the performance of the process. There are, however, instances, where, depending upon the chemistry of the process, recycle water is found to have positive effect on the process.

The recycling of water from the various solid-liquid separations on the concentrate and tailing streams is called internal reuse. Reclamation of water from tailing pond areas, usually more distant from the concentrator, is called external reuse (Rao and Finch, 1989). The opportunities for recycling water from plant products (concentrate and tailing) are schematically shown in Figure 11.1.

Figure 11.1. Some opportunities for recycling water in a semi-arid region in Australia. Typical values for percent solid have been used. Note that the use of a thickened tailing disposal system or underground past fill may require an extra water removal step after the tailing thickener. It is assumed that 40 percent of the water reaching the tailing dam can be recycled, the remainder being lost by evaporation and retained within the tailing dam, with minor input of water to the tailing dam from annual rainfall. (Johnson, 2003).

The maximization of recycling of water is achieved when there is (I) maximum removal of water from each of the product streams; and (ii) return of water to the processing from all of the product streams.

A more complex example of the recycling of water for a concentrator could include inputs of water from an underground mine to the concentrator and/or to the tailings area. There could also be an output of water from the concentrator to the mine through the use of backfill or paste fill. (See Chapter 9 for discussion on backfill).

There are many methods by which the hazards risk management team can assess the mitigation options that it has generated for each identified hazard risk. One method, or framework, as it is often called, that has been developed by the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the social, technical, administrative, political, legal, economic, environmental (STAPLEE) method.

Each of these terms represents an opportunity or constraint to implementing a mitigation option. Because communities are generally unique in their overall makeup, a single mitigation option analyzed according to the STAPLEE criteria may produce different outcomes among various places.

Each criterion considers a different aspect of the community and requires specific methods of information collection and analysis. There is no definable or identifiable priority or weight assigned to any of these criteria; the order of letters in the acronym was determined by the word they formed (which was meant to be easy to remember).

Social. A mitigation option will be viable only if it is socially accepted within the community where it is implemented. The public is instrumental in guiding decisions such as these through their support or lack of it. Even with public support, a proposed mitigation option might not work, but without public support, the action taken will almost certainly fail. Disaster risk managers must have a clear understanding of how the mitigation option will affect the population. They must investigate several questions that will guide their interpretation of this criterion:Will the proposed action adversely affect any one segment of the population? Will it give some disproportionate benefit to only one segment?Will the action disrupt established neighborhoods; break up legal, political, or electoral districts; or cause the relocation of lower-income people?Is the proposed action compatible with present and future community values?Will the actions adversely affect cultural values or resources?

Technical. If the proposed action is investigated and found not to be technically feasible, it is probably not a good option. In addition, when looking into the technical feasibility of each option, it is important to investigate whether it will help to reduce losses in the long term and whether it has secondary effects that could nullify its benefits. By addressing the following questions, the hazards risk management team can determine the suitability of their proposed actions based on the actual degree of help those actions will ultimately provide:How effective is the action in avoiding or reducing future losses? It is important that the measures taken are able to achieve the anticipated results, not a fraction of them.Will it create more problems than it fixes?Does it solve the problem or only a symptom?

Administrative. This measure investigates the communitys capabilities for carrying out the projects required to implement each mitigation option. Specifically, the disaster managers will look at each options requirements in terms of:StaffingFundingMaintenance

The community may be able to implement some options on their own using their own resources, whereas other options will require (often significant) outside assistance. The questions disaster managers must answer include:Does the jurisdiction have the capability (staff, technical experts, and/or funding) to implement the action, and can it be readily obtained?Can the community provide the necessary maintenance work required to maintain the method of mitigation?Can the implementation project be accomplished in a timely manner, without excessive disruption to the community?

Political. Mitigation actions tend to be highly political. Like most other government actions, they tend to entail spending local funds and using local services, require permits and permissions, involve some alteration to the fabric of the community, may involve some use of public lands, and involve a certain amount of risk for the political leaders who authorize the actions. The political nature of each option will likewise be an influential decision-making factor when options are being chosen for implementation. Disaster managers will need to be aware of or will need to investigate how local, regional, and national political leaders feel about issues related to agenda items such as the environment, economic development, safety, and emergency management. Logically, actions that go against the current administrations political ideology in any of these areas are likely to receive less support than those that are in line with its beliefs. It is common for proposed mitigation actions to fail because they lack this much-needed political support.

Disaster managers can measure political support for their mitigation options by addressing the following questions:Is there political support to implement and maintain this action?Have political leaders participated in the planning process so far?Is there a local champion willing to see the action to completion?Who are the stakeholders in this proposed action, and how do they feel about the changes that will occur as a result of the action?Is there enough public support toward which political leaders are likely to lean, to ensure the success of the action?Have all of the stakeholders been offered an opportunity to participate in the planning process?How can the mitigation objectives be accomplished at the lowest cost to the public?

Legal. Many mitigation options require actions to be taken that need legal authority to be lawfully conducted. Disaster managers must determine whether they will be able to establish the legal authority at the national, provincial, state, or local levels to implement the proposed mitigation actions. It may even be necessary to propose the passage of new laws or regulations to accommodate the needs of the mitigation measure if such legal authority is weak or nonexistent. However, this legal authority is best established long before the mitigation action is taken because of the exhaustive process of making or changing laws.

Depending on the country where the mitigation actions are being conducted, government entities at each structural level may operate under their own specific source of delegated authority. Local governments may operate under enabling legislation that gives them the power to engage in certain activities, or under informal governance systems based on tribal or other forms of law.

Disaster managers need to identify the unit of government that ultimately has the authority to grant or deny the permission to undertake actions necessary to implement the mitigation action. They are well served to understand the interrelations among the various levels of government to anticipate political roadblocks or challenges that may arise. Much of this information can be obtained by asking:Does the government in question have the authority to grant permissions or permits for the work to be conducted?Is there a technical, scientific, or legal basis for the mitigation action (i.e., does the mitigation action fit the hazard setting)?Are the proper laws, ordinances, and resolutions in place to implement the action?Are there potential legal consequences?Will there be issues of liability for the actions or support of actions, or lack of action, by any of the mitigation stakeholders?Is the action likely to be challenged by stakeholders who may be negatively affected?

Economic. Like all community projects, mitigation options must prove to be cost-effective to the community before they are considered viable for implementation. The mitigation measures must also be affordable to those who will be funding the project. Mitigation projects often require maintenance, at the expense of the community where it is implemented, long after the project is completed. For this reason, affordability means many things, including being able to be funded without restructuring local budgets, able to be financed but with some budget restructuring required, able to be funded but requiring a special tax to be imposed, able to be financed but requiring external loans, and so on.

Mitigation measures that are cost-free to the community or that can be financed within a current budget cycle are much more attractive to government officials who are making funding decisions than are options that require general obligation bonds or other forms of debt that ultimately draw on future community funds.

Communities that have little money to support mitigation actions (a common condition) are likely to be more willing to support a mitigation option if it can be funded, in part or in whole, by some alternative (outside) source or sources. Disaster managers should ask the following questions when considering the economic aspects of mitigation options:Are there currently sources of funds that can be used to implement the action?What benefits will the action provide?Does the cost seem reasonable for the size of the problem and likely benefits?What financial burden will be placed on the tax base or local economy to implement or maintain this action?Will the result of the action negatively affect the economy in some secondary manner, such as reducing some form of income generation that was dependent on the existence of the hazard?Does the action contribute to other community economic goals, such as capital improvements or economic development?

Environmental. Many mitigation measures affect the natural environment, positively or negatively, and occasionally both positively and negatively to some degree. Disaster managers must consider these effects, because their actions could have long-term effects on the community and could negate any positive gains of the mitigation action.

Benefits to the environment often arise from implementing a mitigation measure, which must be considered when choosing options. Floodplain buyout programs, for instance, which include acquisition and relocation of structures out of identified floodplains, help to restore the natural function of the floodplain. Vegetation management, which is often performed to control the wildfire hazard risk to humans and property, also provides the same protection to the environment.

Questions that disaster managers should ask when considering the environmental factors associated with particular mitigation options include:How will this action affect the environment (including land, water, and air resources and endangered species)?Will this action comply with environmental laws and regulations?Is the action consistent with the communitys environmental values and goals?

International economic, environmental, and technological advances over the past decade have contributed toward the consideration of CBM recovery and CO2 sequestration together. The idea is to geologically sequester CO2, while at the same time recovering the methane already in them. The CO2 would be injected via wells drilled into the coal, and the CO2 would drive the methane out of the coal through the wells to the surface, where it would be collected. This two-birds-with-one-stone idea is feasible because bituminous coal stores twice the volume of CO2 than it stores methane. The net result would be less CO2 in the atmosphere, no significant new methane added to the atmosphere, and enhanced recovery of methane to help pay for the process.

What about the logistics and cost of this CBM/CO2 strategy? Most US power plants are within 35miles of a coalbed (not necessarily a suitable one). For a plant near a gassy coalbed (or multiple beds, for coal often occurs in multiple seams), pipeline length would be minimal to convey CO2 from the plant into the coal, and to pipe recovered methane back to the power plant.

The environmental impacts and economic feasibility are often evaluated across different scenarios for comparison. For example, Clare et al. (2015) compared the economic and carbon abatement potential of straw pyrolysis for biochar and electrical energy production with two design scenarios (straw briquetting and combustion for heat generation and straw gasification for electrical energy production) and two baseline scenarios (straw reincorporation into the soil and straw burning on the field). Harsono et al. (2013) compared the energy balances, GHG emissions, and economics of biochar production from the slow pyrolysis of empty fruit brunches in a palm oil mill with that of a baseline case where empty fruit brunches were applied to the trees in the palm oil plantation. Homagain et al. (2016) compared the economics of four scenarios of biochar-based bioenergy production and soil application in terms of high or low feedstock availabilities and with or without soil application. The scenario setting also echoes the reference scenario selection during LCA that may significantly affect the resulting carbon abatement potential. Shabangu et al. (2014) compared the economic feasibility of pine to biochar and methanol based on three technological scenarios, that is, slow pyrolysis at 300 and 450C, and gasification at 800C, with the same processing of the volatiles into syngas and the conversion of the syngas into methanol. Baseline scenarios could be selected based on the existing biomass utilization practice together with multiple design scenarios for system optimization and selection. The LCA and CBA results could vary significantly across different scenarios.

Although environmental economics focuses strongly on the problems of achieving economic efficiency and maximizing social welfare, reliance on both market-oriented economic institutions and democratic political institutions is based on an approach that emphasizes the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms as the basic moral foundation of society. Libertarians, for example, stress the sanctity of property rights that were acquired justly in accordance with the requirements of the law and respect for the rights of others. Egalitarian liberals, in contrast, emphasize the concept of equality of opportunity, though they agree with libertarians that public policies should be structured to support people's freedom that is, their ability to define and pursue their own conception of the good life. These theories treat rights as fundamental and do not see maximizing social welfare as a well-defined, ex ante policy objective. Liberal theories, however, do see a role for democratic governments to promote a conception of the public interest that is legitimated through (and limited by) the consent of the governed.

On the one hand, a perceived right to pursue individual self-interest in markets might be construed as conferring a right to release carbon dioxide and other pollutants into the atmosphere without constraint by government. Clearly, this value judgment plays a role in political debates over climate change policy.

On the other hand, democratic societies are grounded on the principle that individuals' positive freedom to pursue self-interest is limited by other people's negative freedom to be protected against uncompensated harms, including bodily harms and damage to private property. In English and American law, it is well established that economic actors have no right to undertake actions that inflict a risk of serious harms that jeopardize other people's lives, health, and livelihoods. Such actions are regulated by both torts law and by environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. Moreover, these statutes are premised on a principle known as the public-trust doctrine, which holds that certain types of environmental resources are the joint property of each member of society. Rights to enjoy the benefits of public trust resources are usufructuary in nature the utilization of such resources comes with an obligation to insure that similar benefits are available for the enjoyment of others and that the integrity of the resource base is conserved from each generation to the next.

What are the implications of rights-based ethics for climate change policy? As noted above, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change calls for stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the Earth's climate. The achievement of this goal is believed to be consistent with the short-run utilization of fossil fuels and other sources of greenhouse gas emissions as a gradual transition is made from current to post-carbon energy technologies. In this sense, this criterion allows for some exercise of positive economic freedoms.

On the other hand, this language deems it illegitimate to allow greenhouse gases to accumulate in the atmosphere beyond the 2C temperature warming limit established by the Copenhagen Accord. This limit reflects decision-makers' judgment concerning the level of climate change that should be considered dangerous, taking into account both the projected benefits of climate stabilization and the uncertain but well-established risk that unmitigated climate change would inflict catastrophic ecological, social, and economic costs, thereby violating the right of future generations to freedom from uncompensated harms.

Critics have argued that this approach to climate policy is unsound because there is no bright line, technical definition of what constitutes danger or exactly how the rights of today's polluters and members of future generations are to be balanced except through subjective judgment. The approach seems to change the role of economists and other analysts from prescribing optimal policies to gauging the impacts of alternative policies on various stakeholder groups (including future generations) and on natural systems. Importantly, the emphasis on risk implies a need to employ techniques from decision science and statistics for characterizing the likelihood of low-probability, high-consequence events. In decision science, rational decisions are sometimes driven by a desire to advert the prospect of highly adverse outcomes even if they are unlikely to occur. This calls into question the common practice of studying climate change policies in deterministic optimization models that abstract away from uncertainty and that impose a priori value judgments through the choice of the objective function.

Critics also argue that taking aggressive steps to stabilize climate would be economically inefficient and might actually serve to reduce the welfare of future generations by adversely affecting the rate of economic growth. Here, it is important to note that the current generation of models suggests that climate stabilization would confer large expected net benefits on people living in the twenty-second century and beyond. Simply put, climate stability may be viewed as a productive form of natural capital that contributes positively to long-run human flourishing.

The efficiency question is less clear-cut. While deterministic models that employ high discount rates suggest that climate stabilization might be economically inefficient, stochastic models that assume a plausibly high degree of risk aversion suggest that the present-value net benefits of climate stabilization are positive if the analysis allows for a degree of uncertainty concerning climate dynamics and climate change damages that is consistent with the current state of the scientific literature.

The literature on environmental economics has derived various conditions for designing efficient policies. However, the policies implemented rarely satisfy those conditions. The deviation mainly results from politics. To better understand the formation of environmental policy and its welfare consequences, an analysis based on political economy is needed.

According to the public-choice theory, a government is not a unitary being; instead, it is regarded as a set of institutions through which individuals reach collective decisions. The process of policy formation contains several players, including voters, interest groups, bureaucrats, political parties, a judiciary, and so on. This article focuses on two of them: special-interest groups and voters. Such treatment definitely does not mean that other political agents are unimportant; it just reflects the fact that most of the related literature concentrates on these two facets of the political process. In addition, this article is confined to the theoretical literature and overlooks empirical studies.

This article introduces lobbying models in the section Special-Interest Groups. Among the various approaches dealing with lobbying, here the focus is on the common-agency (or menu-auction) approach. This approach, which has been widely applied to the determination of other public policies, is regarded as the most promising approach to a positive theory of environmental regulation.

Then the voting mechanism is discussed in the section Voting and Election. The central part of this section is the widely used median-voter theorem. Two types of democratic structures have been distinguished: direct democracy and representative democracy; each has its unique issues.

The coastal and marine natural resources of an LME are capital assetsin effect representing wealth embodied in its marine natural resources. Capital assets, natural or otherwise, can provide valuable services (interest) over time if maintained, much like savings in a bank provide a flow of interest income.

Underlying much of environmental economics is the notion of resource valuation (i.e., valuing nature's services). Resource valuation involves the use of concepts and methods to estimate the economic value the public holds for natural resource services.16 These services may be direct or indirect; and they may or may not be bought and sold in the marketplace.

Direct services include on site use of marine parks, beaches, commercial fishing, exploitation of marine minerals, or harvesting of fish, shellfish or wood from mangroves. Indirect services occur off site, for example, when fish produced by a mangrove are harvested many miles away. Some natural resources services are exchanged in organized markets, such as commercial fisheries, oil and other minerals, some coastal property, or tourism. However, a central feature of many, if not most, marine resource issues is that the services provided are not traded on markets. The services provided, as for example, by mangroves, corals, and sea grasses, water quality, recreation, scenic amenities and biodiversity are not bought and sold on markets and, as a result, often are given inadequate attention in public policy.

Four types of value are associated with resource services. First, use value is the benefit received from on site or physical use, such as harvesting of fish, exploitation of oil or beach use. Second, passive use value is the enjoyment one gets from a resource above and beyond any direct use.17 Passive use losses may arise if individuals feel worse off when they learn of the loss of an endangered species, closure of beaches or other adverse impact on other natural resources, even if they do not use these resources themselves. People might be willing to pay to prevent such losses, much as they might pay to preserve, say, an historically or culturally significant building or site, even if they never actually visit it. Third, total value is the sum of use and passive use value. Fourth, individuals also may think of a resource as having an option value when either supply (e.g., threat of extinction; the outcome of a policy) or demand is uncertain. Option value may be thought of as what would be paid to keep the opportunity open to later use a site or resource.

Resource valuation usually is not an end in itself, except in the case of commodities such as oil or other minerals, or of fish, where the government might lease public resources to private businesses.18 Instead, estimates of the value of particular resource services normally are more useful as contributions to policy for improving resource management. Most policy decisions involve specific proposals affecting resources and their services at the margin; hence, resource valuation most often will involve assessments of the marginal value of resource services rather than the aggregate value.

Social and cultural factors correspond to and reinforce the need for economic valuation, but their focus and the use of sociocultural analysis is also quite different. Indicators such as income, employment, and economic sector performance are elements of both types of investigation. However, sociocultural analysis takes a step away from strict enumeration of these elements and focuses on people's knowledge and views (norms and values) about their work, and how this affects their perceptions and actions towards LME resources (Brainerd et al. 1996). Although this is not easily measured on a monetary scale, these factors are considered significant by those involved in resource use. Sociocultural analysis has the capacity to contribute to management by considering the values of cultural and social elements of the community, and the potential costs associated with social and economic disruption and dislocation.

Social and cultural factors are closely linked to governance, users and uses of LME resources. One way to account for these linkages is to view human action within the context of Natural Resource Communities (NRCs) (Dyer et al. 1992). The interface between a regional system of extractive NRCs, their service flows and the associated LME is here defined as a Natural Resource Region (NRR).19 Dyer et al. (1992) define NRCs as populations whose sustainability depends upon the utilization of renewable natural resources. By broadening the definition to include those dependent on non-renewable aspects of the marine environment as well, they and their aggregations as NRRs represent the LME-dependent communities within a coastal region.

The Natural Resource Region (NRR) includes social, cultural, human, economic and biophysical capital and their interactions within networks of LME-dependent communities (Dyer and Poggie 1998). These forms of capital are defined as follows:

Social capital refers to the interactive networks of humans that occurs within and between natural resource communities. Social capital is key to the flow of other forms of capital, as well as central to the dynamics of governance and resource utilization.

Biophysical capital, as explained above, is used to denote those natural resources of an LME that directly or indirectly generate flows of goods and services used by humans. The value of these natural resources is derived from the dynamic between human action and the natural environment. These include potential resources, identified but not actively utilized in extractive processes, or those having primary value in passive recreational activities (e.g. the whale as resource to the whale watching industry).

Fishing is a good example of the interactions of some of these forms of capital. A fishing boat out at sea is a production-extraction unit of the NRR, relying directly on the productivity of the fish resources of the LME (the NRR biophysical asset). The fishing boat is thus an extension of the NRC from which it came, carrying with it social, cultural, human, and manufactured capital in its hunt for fish resources.

The conceptualization of capital interactions within an NRR network lends understanding to the occupational valuation placed on way of life. For example, Doeringer, Moss and Terkla (1986) show how kinship support systemsa form of social capital in our formulationallow fishermen to maintain labor linkages to the fishing industry in defiance of seemingly debilitating economic conditions, usually associated with declines in volume and value of fish catch, as well as severe management restrictions on fishing.

In the interface with LMEs, primary units of human-environment interactionindividuals, families, households or communitiesare to be viewed as interconnected within regional networks held together by shared values and forms of capital. The NRC is a nodal form of human organizational structures, regional and capital interactions, and provides for points of spatial reference by which to study the LME-NRR dynamic.

Networks of Natural Resource Communities within NRRs act as conduits through which total capital is exchanged, shared, and transformed by human action. For example, we can consider the NRC20 as a regional contributor to whatever commerce is stimulated by LME-related activities, and as a means of providing sustainable support to LME-related households and families as they contribute products and services to the region and nation in which they are embedded. While only a subset of the NRC interact directly with the marine environment and its resources (e.g. fishermen, shipping vessel operators), these individuals are nevertheless connected to more differentiated communities and towns, contributing to the economic and food security of those communities and towns and buffering coastal development in a way that contributes to social and economic diversity.

Social impact assessment variables point to measurable change in the human population, communities, and social relationships resulting from policy change (ICGP 1993). The Interorganizational Committee on Guidelines and Principles (1993) identified a list of social variables under the general headings of (1) population characteristics, (2) community and institutional structures, (3) political and social resources, (4) individual, household and family changes, and (5) community resources. Definitions of each heading considered by the Committee are given below.

Community and institutional structures mean the size, structure and level of organization of local government to include linkages to the larger political systems. The historical and present patterns of employment and industrial diversification. The size and level of activity of voluntary organizations and interest groups and finally, how these institutions relate to each other.

Political and social resources refer to the distribution of power and authority, the identification of interested and affected parties as well as the leadership capability and capacity within the community or region.

Individual, household and family changes refer to factors which influence the daily life of the individuals, households and families, including attitudes, perceptions, family and household characteristics and social networks. These changes range from attitudes toward the policy to an alteration in family and household relations and social networks to perceptions of risk, health and safety.

Community resources include patterns of natural resource and land use; the availability of housing and community services to include health, police and fire protection and sanitation facilities. Key to the continuity and survival of human communities are their historical and archaeological cultural resources. Under this collection of variables we also consider possible changes for indigenous, ethnic and religious sub-cultures.

Sociocultural elements may also be assessed by performance indicators related to equity issues such as the distribution of benefits among stakeholders, the nature of access to LME resources, and the reliance of communities on LME resources (Clay, per. com., 1998). The distribution of income is a measure of equity within natural resource communities and between communities and wider society. Benefits distribution can take other forms such as the pattern of fish consumption and distribution, and allocation of and/or access to resources. The nature of access to LME resources considers property rights as well as the local involvement in resource management. Community reliance on LME resources may take several forms including employment and other economic factors, food security and cultural factors. The relative importance of different social variables will vary depending on the specific community and its relationship to the resource in question.

Dyer and Griffith (1996) isolated five variables that help identify fishing community dependence on an LME. It will become obvious that the five variables overlap somewhat; thus, they must be considered together. These are:

Relative isolation or integration of LME resource users into alternative economic sectors. To what extent have users (e.g., fishermen, processors) segmented themselves from other parts of the local political economy or other fisheries?

User types and strategies of users within a port of access to LME resources. What impact does the mix of types (e.g., fixed fishing gearweirs, fish corralsversus mobile fishing gear) across ports and States have on the long-term sustainability of LME resource stocks?

Degree of regional specialization. To what extent have users from related areas and use-sectors moved into the region? Clearly, those users who would have difficulty moving into alternative use-sectors are more dependent on LME resources than those who have histories of moving among several sectors in an opportunistic fashion.

Percentage of population involved in LME resource-related industries. Those communities where between five and ten percent of the population are directly employed in LME resource-related industries are more dependent on the LME than those where fewer than five percent are so employed.

Competition and conflict within the port, between different components of use sectors. Competition between smaller scale and industrial scale users can create conflict between users within the same portas well as between different actors in a use-sector (such as boat owners, captains, and processors). Dependence may have a strong perceptual dimension, with users perceiving the resources they are extracting to be scarce and that one user group's gain (e.g. industrial trawling, purse seining) is another user group's loss (e.g. gill netting).

These five variables can be adapted and broadened to cover the full range of LME-related activities. A fundamental assumption of the NRR model is that there is some degree of reliance on the natural resources (i.e., biophysical capital) of an LME. In an LME-linked NRC, biophysical capital reliance manifests itself as learned social behaviors of LME-related activities. The combined social, cultural and economic interactions arise from the conditions that increase or decrease access to the LME and its biophysical capital. Furthermore, dependence on natural resources limits the occupational roles of community members, and can intensify cultural assimilation for those immigrating into an NRC.

Disruption of LMEs is occurring more frequently as NRRs are stressed by human factors that push resources beyond their ability to renew themselves and permanently degrade physical structures such as bottom topography. Such resource degradation patterns in an NRR can be found in conditions of severe poverty, overpopulation, the practice of destructive extraction techniques (e.g. blast fishing in Philippine reef systems), or the development of overcapacity in a fishery (e.g. the groundfish fisheries of New England, Dyer and Griffith 1996). In an idealized condition, an effective state of environmental awareness is generated among NRC residents and NRR networks that allows for sustainable utilization of biophysical capital in an LME. Less idealized conditionsmost real world ecosystems and their human actorsrequire some form of management appropriate to the political ecology and cultural and environmental history of the region in question. Thus, although a generic LME/NRR management framework for the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Maine may be conceptually similar, operationalizing the model cannot proceed without considering site-specific human-environmental dynamics.

The interdependence of economic, social, cultural and governance elements is readily apparent. They overlap, complement, and conflict with one another in different situations. Their relative importance and tradeoffs between different sociocultural and economic values will depend on the interplay of the community, LME resources, and larger society.

Economic instruments can be defined as mechanisms that force economic agents to internalize all or part of the social costs associated with environmentally harmful activities and that rely on market forces to promote efficiency. In doing so, they seek to impose additional costs on producers that harm the environment and reward those that improve environment outcomes, while utilizing market forces to improve the allocation of resources. (Some analysts include subsidies among economic instruments but as they are voluntary and economic agents are not forced to internalize the social costs they are more appropriately classified as voluntary instruments.)

This approach to environmental protection is usually associated with environmental economics, a school of economic thought that is a subdiscipline of neoclassical economics. According to environmental economists, environmental problems arise because of the existence of externalitiesimpacts involuntarily incurred by a person or persons without compensation or payment as a result of the actions of another. Because of the existence of externalities, markets are unable to guarantee the efficient allocation of resources. For example, if producers emit pollution into the atmosphere without paying for it, the price that consumers pay for the producers outputs will not reflect the full social cost of the transaction. As a result, there will be excessive output and consumption of the relevant good or service. If producers are forced to internalize the social costs associated with the air pollution, there would be a more efficient tradeoff between air pollution and output, leading to higher net social welfare.

The more recent trend in environmental economics has been to characterize environmental problems as being a product of the incomplete allocation of property rights. According to this approach, if a property right over the relevant environmental resource were appropriately defined and allocated to individuals, and there was perfect information and no transaction costs, the operation of market forces would lead to efficient outcomes. For example, if the atmosphere were owned by someone and producers had to pay to emit pollution, then negotiation between the owner and producers would ensure the most efficient allocation of atmospheric resources. On the basis of these theories, economic instruments either

place a restriction on the amount of pollution that can be emitted or resource that can be used and then allow pollution or resource entitlements to be traded among economic agents (called marketable permit or cap-and-trade schemes, e.g., tradable emission, water, catch and development rights schemes); or

seek to create well-defined, secure, and transferable property rights over environmental resources and allocate these to relevant individuals or groups (pure property rights approaches, e.g., land titles and fishing area rights).

Marketable permit schemes and pure property rights approaches are similar in that both rely on the creation and exchange of property rights to promote environmental and economic outcomes. But pure property rights approaches place no external restrictions on the use of the relevant resource and rely on market incentives to achieve the desired environmental outcome, while marketable permit schemes rely on a cap or limit on the use of the relevant resource to achieve the desired environmental outcome.

One of the major benefits associated with economic instruments is that by utilizing market forces they can encourage a more efficient allocation of resources. For example, when tradable emission quotas are used, the operation of market forces should ensure that the necessary emission reductions are achieved at least cost (i.e., the equimarginal principle should be satisfied). Further, economic instruments provide an incentive for producers to reduce pollution, which encourages innovation. Advocates of economic instruments also claim they are more flexible than regulatory instruments, although this is not always the case.

Although economic instruments can be more efficient than alternative policy mechanisms, they can suffer from a number of weaknesses. In relation to pollution fees, individual liability and pure property rights approaches, there can be a considerable amount of uncertainty associated with environmental outcomes. For example, producers may choose to absorb the increase in costs associated with a pollution fee, or demand may be unresponsive to price rises, meaning the level of pollution may not decline by the desired amount. Consequently, where policy-makers are faced with uncertainty regarding environmental risks and questions regarding irreversibility, alternative approaches can be preferable.

Like regulatory approaches, marketable permit schemes (or cap-and-trade approaches) can place an upper limit on the permissible amount of pollution or resource extraction. Hence, they can be useful in dealing with uncertainty and threshold effects. The advantage that marketable permit schemes offer is that having set a specified limit on pollution or resource extraction, they allow market forces to determine the allocation of pollution or extraction rights among producers. One of the most successful marketable pollution permit schemes has been the United States Environmental Protection Agencys Sulfur Dioxide Program, which is part of the broader Acid Rain Program. The cost of reducing emissions was substantially lower than predicted because producers had an incentive to find cheaper ways to do so.

Problems arise with marketable permit schemes when there is a lack of equivalence between the environment or pollution units that producers are expected to trade (i.e., the resource is not homogeneous). For example, tradable development permit schemes that place a limit on the amount of development in an area but allow developers to exchange development rights can lead to the rights moving toward the developments with the highest economic returns. However, they will not necessarily achieve biodiversity objectives as each parcel of land may contain different biodiversity values. Similar problems can arise with emission schemes that allow emission permits to be generated through the enhancement of sinks (i.e., there can be uncertainty about whether the enhancement of sinks will offset the additional emissions).

Transaction costs can also pose problems for economic instruments. Devising schemes that can be administered in a cost-effective manner can sometimes be difficult. Further, if there are excessive costs associated with the negotiation and exchange of marketable permits, the efficiency benefits may not materialize.

As with all environmental policy mechanisms, politics can impede the effective use of economic instruments. However, economic instruments can be especially vulnerable to political influences if it is necessary to constantly adjust the price signals provided through the scheme. For example, if a carbon tax is used to address climate change, it will be necessary to adjust the tax over time to account for unexpected events and new information. Special interest groups may impede this process, thereby undermining the efficacy of the tax.

There has been a tendency in the past for regulatory instruments and economic instruments to be presented as substitutes. In practice, these two types of instruments are generally used as complements and economic instruments always require a regulatory framework. Indeed, there is a growing recognition of the need for policy packages or policy mixes that use a range of instruments to achieve environmental protection objectives.

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Ore Geology Reviews aims to familiarize all earth scientists with recent advances in a number of interconnected disciplines related to the study of, and search for, ore deposits. The reviews range from brief to longer contributions, but the journal preferentially publishes manuscripts that fill